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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Facts. 
This is an appeal from a denial of attorney fees under sections 12-1 17 and 
12-121, Idaho Code. Respondent Eastern Idaho Public Health District ("EIPHD"), 
formerly District Seven Health Department ("District Seven") (hereafter "EIPHD") is a 
separate governmental entity organized pursuant to IDAHO CODE 5 39-401 B. In 
1996, appellant Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, L.L.C. ("SIPP") applied for 
and obtained a permit from EIPHD to build an individual sub-surface sewage disposal 
and tank suitable for the use of one or two commercial buildings, not to exceed 300 
gallons per day. Agency Record ("AR), Petitioners' Exh. C. EIPHD later inspected the 
tank, determined it was in substantial compliance with the permit, and lifted sanitary 
restrictions. AR, Petitioners' Exh. D. SIPP and appellant Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. 
("Sunnyside Utilities") (hereafter collectively "Sunnyside") thereafter sold multiple 
commercial lots in their subdivision, providing sewer services to approximately 11 
commercial buildings on the septic system. AR, Doc. 16, f[ 6. 
Idaho Code 5 39-414(2) granted EIPHD a general power to "do all things 
required for the preservation and protection of public health." A Memorandum of 
Understanding ("MOU") between the Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ) 
and EIPHD identified their respective duties regarding septic tanks. Record ("R"), p. 
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105-06. EIPHD was given authority over individual systems such as the one for which 
Sunnyside obtained a permit, while DEQ retained general authority over central systems, 
defined as "any system which receives blackwaste or wastewater . . . from more than two 
(2) dwelling units or more than two (2) buildings under separate ownership." R. p. 38. 
Although Sunnyside's system was unlawfully connected to 11 commercial buildings, it 
had never been approved as a "central system." R. p. 54. 
On June 9, 2006, Sunnyside's system failed, resulting in raw sewage on the 
surface of the drain field. AR, Respondent's Exh. 9; R., p. 55. EIPHD granted 
Sunnyside a permit to provide emergency remediation, under the condition that the 
repaired system would be temporary and must be abandoned once a permanent system 
had been approved and installed. AR, Respondent's Exh. 8. After a meeting with the 
City of Idaho Falls, EIPHD set a deadline of July 7,2006 for Sunnyside to provide proof 
that the raw sewage had been cleaned and that septic tank pumping was being 
maintained. AR, Respondent's Exh. 9. EIPHD also determined that the only options 
available for appellants were either to connect to the City of Idaho Falls' facilities or 
install a large soil absorption central system, or central system, that met the flow needs of 
the subdivision, and set a deadline of July 7,2006 for Sunnyside to provide a timeline for 
completion of either permanent solution to the problem. Id. 
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On September 21,2006, Kelly Eager ("Eager"), Environmental Health 
Director for EIPHD, sent Sunnyside a "Notice of Intent to Reimpose Sanitary 
Restrictions" since no permanent correction had taken place as requested. AR, 
Petitioners' Exh. S. Eager's letter fiu-ther noted that EIPHD would issue a certificate of 
disapproval after notice and an opportunity to appeal. Id. 
B. Administrative History. 
Sunnyside filed a Notice of Appeal from the Notice of Intent to Reimpose 
Sanitary Restrictions on October 27,2006. On November 28,2006, EIPHD Director 
Richard 0 .  Home ("Home") issued a decision affirming the decision to re-impose 
sanitary restrictions. AR, Doc. 9. Horne stated that EIPHD "intends to re-impose 
sanitary restrictions . . . unless Sunnyside complies with applicable rules by the 
installation of an approved 'Central System' . . . or connecting to an approved 'Public 
System[.]"' Id. Horne noted that the "issue" was that "Sunnyside has not complied with 
the conditions upon which sanitary restrictions were signed off on the plat by installing 
an approved Central Septic System for this subdivision." Id. 
On December 20,2006 Sunnyside appealed to the District Seven Board of 
Health. At the conclusion of the June 2 1,2007 hearing, Connnissioner Robert Cope 
recommended the motion to affirm re-imposition of sanitary restrictions include the 
following understanding: 
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I think what the actual motion should state is that we would move to 
uphold the sanitary restrictions but refer the applicant to DEQ for a remedy. 
Because I think the large system comes under DEQ's purview. The 
existing system that we have a restriction on is ours. . . . 
. . . .  
[I]t looks like, from the definition we have here of central and 
municipal systems coming under the authority of DEQ - 
. . . . 
--it would occur that the remedy to their problem is going to be 
DEQ's responsibility, but the restrictions on the current system are our 
responsibility. 
June 21,2007 Hearing Tr., p. 58,11, 1-7, 12-14, 16-19. Commissioner Cope's 
recommendation was then seconded by Commissioner Radford and Dr. Barbara Nelson. 
Id p. 58,11.20-23. With the understanding that DEQ could provide the remedy but ,
EIPHD was still responsible for placing restrictions on Sunnyside's system, the 
Commissioners upheld the re-imposition. Id., p. 61,ll. 6-17. EIPHD subsequently issued 
a Certificate of Disapproval on February 2,2007, and a Corrected Certificate on March 
29,2007. AR, Docs. 13 & 14. 
C. Procedural History. 
On February 21,2007, Sunnyside filed a "Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment and Judicial Review" ("Petition"). R. p. 5. The Petition specifically requested 
the following relief: 
(1) a declaratory judgment that the Memorandum of Understanding 
("MOLJ") established that District Seven only had jurisdiction over 
individuallsubsurface sewage systems and not central septic systems, which 
appellants claimed they were operating; 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 4 
(2) a declaratory judgment estopping District Seven from re- 
imposing sanitary restrictions and stating "that the construction was in 
compliance with approved plans and specifications, and that the facilities 
substantially complied with regulatory standards in effect at the time of 
facility construction"; 
(3) judicial review of the decisions of District Seven re-imposing 
sanitary restrictions under Idaho Code $67-5279(3); and, accordingly, 
(4) an order setting aside the Certificate of Disapproval dated 
February 1,2007; and 
(5) a finding that the decisions of District Seven were "entered 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law and that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
their reasonable attorney fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses." 
On September 24,2007, the District Court for the County of Bonneville, 
Hon. District Judge Joel C. Tingey, issued a Memorandum Decision and Order. R. p. 
100. After setting forth the applicable standard for judicial review of an agency action, 
R. p. 102-04, the Court stated that "the sole issue . . . is whether District Seven's actions 
were in excess of its statutory authority. I.C. $ 67-5279(3)(h)." R. p. 104. The Court 
determined that, pursuant to Idaho Code $ 50-1326, DEQ was statutorily given the 
authority for re-imposing sanitary restrictions. R. p. 105. However, DEQ was granted 
authority to delegate duties to public health districts. R. p. 106. Pursuant to the MOU, 
DEQ had granted public health districts authority over Individual/Subsurface Sewage 
Disposal Systems, but had retained general authority over "central systems." Id. Since 
the septic system utilized by the appellants "fell within the definition of a central 
system[,]" and the MOU reserved to DEQ the authority to "reimpose sanitary restrictions 
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for water and sewer systems under DEQ's responsibility[,]" the Court determined that 
EIPHD's issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its re-imposition of sanitary 
restrictions were without authority. R. p. 106-08. The Court further held that the 
Certificate of Disapproval, Corrected Certificate of Disapproval, and re-imposition of 
restrictions were null and void. R. p. 108. 
D. Sunnyside's Motion for Attorney Fees. 
On October 5,2007, Sunnyside filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code $5  12-1 17 and 12- 121. R. p. 112-12. EIPHD objected, arguing that fees 
under section 12-1 17 were inappropriate as EIPHD was not "a state agency, a city, a 
county or other taxing district[.]" R. p. 112-21. EIPHD further objected to Sunnyside's 
request for fees under section 12-121, as Sunnyside's "Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
and Judicial Review" did not constitute a "civil action." R. p. 112-22. 
On November 1,2007, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees. R. p. 164. The Court held that it was 
the legislative intent that health districts were not state agencies, but were instead 
"governmental entities whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the 
manner of other single purpose districts." R. p. 165. Accordingly, the Court held that 
attorney fees were not authorized under section 12-1 17. Id. The Court also held that it 
would "decline to award attorney fees under 5 12-1 17 inasmuch as the Court does not 
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believe that the actions of EIPHD were without a reasonable basis in fact or law." ISj, As 
Sunnyside's tank was overflowing and sewage was pooling on the surface of the 
property, the Court noted that there was a reasonable basis in fact for re-imposing 
sanitary restrictions. R. p. 165-66. Furthermore, the Court held that while Idaho Code $ 
39-414(2)-which granted health districts a general power to "do all things required for 
the preservation and protection of public health"-does not supplant specific authority 
granted to DEQ to re-impose sanitary restrictions on central systems, it nevertheless 
formed a legal basis for EIPHD's actions. R. p. 166. 
Regarding Idaho Code $ 12- 12 1, the Court mentioned the "substantial 
amount of case law holding that a judicial review and appeal of an administrative agency 
ruling does not constitute a 'civil action' for purposes of allowing attorney fees under I.C. 
$ 12-121." R. p. 167. The Court noted that one decision, Allen v. Blaine County, 13 1 
Idaho 137, 140-41,953 P.2d 578 (1998) had mentioned in dicta the "possibility" that a 
declaratory judgment action attacking an agency decision could be considered a "civil 
action" for purposes of $ 12-121. Id. It nevertheless determined that it did not need to 
address whether or not Sunnyside's "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial 
Review" was a civil action. Id. As the Court had already found that EIPHD's actions 
were not taken without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the Court further found that the 
matter had not been "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonable, or without 
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foundation." R. p. 167. The Court did, however, grant Sunnyside its costs in a judgment 
issued on November 1,2007. R. p. 169. Sunnyside did not appeal the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order or its Judgment of Costs until 82 days after they were 
issued, on January 22,2008. R. p. 201. 
On November 14,2007, Sunnyside filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of 
Attorney Fees. R. p. 170-1. In its December 10,2007 Memorandum Decision and Order 
for Reconsideration, the Court upheld its previous ruling that a health district is not a 
state agency for purposes of granting attorney fees under section 12-1 17. R. p. 200-2. 
The Court further ruled that a petition seeking judicial review and declaratory judgment 
is not a "civil action" for purposes of section 12-121. R. p. 200-3. The Court found that 
the relief sought by Sunnyside was available on judicial review regardless of whether the 
petition included a request for declaratory judgment. R. p. 200-4. Ultimately, the Court 
found that "the action initiated by Petitioners, regardless of its label, was an appeal of an 
administrative decision. As an appeal, 5 12-121 does not apply." Id. 
Sunnyside appealed both the November 1,2007 and December 10,2007 
decisions of the District Court regarding attorney fees on January 22,2008. R. p. 201. 
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11. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review on Appeal. 
The appellate court exercises free review over the decision of a district 
court applying Idaho Code 5 12-1 17. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 
109 P.3d 1091 (2005). 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12- 
121 is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Stout v. Key Training Corn., 144 
Idaho 195, 196, 158 P.3d 97 1 (2007). However, when an award of attorney fees depends 
on the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review for statutory interpretation 
applies. Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the] Court 
exercises free review." Id. 
B. Attorney Fees under Idaho Code 5 12-117. 
Idaho Code 8 12-1 17 provides for an award of attorney fees under the 
following conditions: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, 
a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
. . . .  
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(b) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 67- 
5201, Idaho Code. 
Section 67-5201 gives the following definition of "agency": 
(2) "Agency" means each state board, commission, department or 
officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but 
does not include the legislative or judicial branches, executive officers 
listed in section 1, article IV, of the constitution of the state of Idaho in the 
exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from the constitution, 
the state militia or the state board of correction. 
EIPHD does not dispute that Sunnyside was the prevailing party in its 
action for judicial review. Accordingly, the Court must determine (1) whether EIPHD, a 
public health district, is a "state agency;" and (2) whether EIPHD acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. If the Court concludes either determination in the 
negative, it should then find that Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-1 17. 
I. Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 6 12-1 17 
as EIPHD is not a state agencv or enumerated governmental entity. 
Sunnyside do not contend that EIPHD is a "city, a county, or other taxing 
district[.]" As such, EIPHD will only address whether it is a "state agency." 
An "agency" under 5 67-5201 is a "state entity empowered to affect an 
individual's legal rights or duties." Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 
P.2d 1214 (1997) (citing Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, a e  Idaho Administratioiz 
Procedure's Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 273,282 (1993)). By 
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the plain language of the statute, only state government entities are agencies. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that the definition of "agency" under $ 67-5201 indicates that it 
is intended to apply to "state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies." 
Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. Citv Council of Citv of Boise, 134 Idaho 
651, 653, 8 P.3d 646 (2000). Therefore, for example, county or city governments do not 
fall within the definition of "agency'3n $ 67-5201, Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs 
m, 139 Idaho 5,7,72 P.3d 845 (2003); neither does a city council, Idaho Historic 
Preservation Council, 134 Idaho 651,654, 8 P.3d 646; a county board of commissioners, 
Petersen, 130 Idaho at 182,938 P.2d at 1220; Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 
859,993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2002); or a Board of Trustees for a school district, Smith v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,721-22,918 P.2d 583 (1996). 
EIPHD was established pursuant to Idaho Code $ 39-401 & This 
statute provides that EIPHD and the other public health districts created pursuant to the 
statute are not "state agencies": 
The various health districts, as provided for in this chapter, are not a single 
department of state government unto themselves, nor are they a part of any 
of the twenty (20) departments of state government authorized by section 
20, article IV, Idaho constitution, or of the departments prescribed in 
section 67-2402. Idaho Code. 
It is legislative intent that health districts operate and be recognized not as 
state agencies or departments, but as governmental entities whose creation 
has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other single 
purpose districts. Pursuant to this intent, and because health districts are 
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not state departments or agencies, health districts are exempt from the 
required participation in the services of the purchasing agent or employee 
liability coverage, as rendered by the department of administration. 
However, nothing shall prohibit the health districts from entering into 
contractural [contractual] arrangements with the department of 
administration, or any other department of state government or an elected 
constitutional officer, for these or any other services. 
. . . .  
This section merely affirms that health districts created under this chapter 
are not state agencies, and in no way changes the character of those 
agencies as they existed prior to this act. 
Sunnyside erroneously claims that the "purpose" of section 39-401 is to exempt public 
health districts from "participation in the services of the purchasing agent or employee 
liability coverage, as rendered by the department of administration." IDAHO CODE $39- 
401. The statute, however, does not state that the exemption is its "purpose." The sole 
purpose of the statute is to "affirm[] that health districts created under this chapter are not 
state agencies[.]" Id. It is only "pursuant" to the legislahue's intent and "because health 
districts are not state departments or agencies" that they receive the exemption mentioned 
in the statute. Section 39-401 need not, as Sunnyside insists, state that the legislature 
intends to "exempt the health districts from having to pay attorney fees[.]" App. Br., p. 
13. Because EIPHD is "not [a] state agenc[ylW under section 39-401, it is likewise not a 
"state agency" under section 12-1 17 or a "state board, commission, department or 
officer" under section 67-5201. 
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Instead, public health districts are "governmental entities whose creation 
has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other single purpose districts." 
IDAHO CODE $ 39-401. The language of section 39-401 is repeated with respect to the 
Idaho Digital Learning Academy ("IDLA") in Idaho Code 533-5502 (stating that the 
IDLA is to "operate and be recognized not as a state agency or department, but as a 
governmental entity whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the manner 
as other single purpose districts"); and the Idaho State Independent Living Council in 
Idaho Code $ 56-1201 (same). A non-exhaustive list of other "single purpose districts" 
include school districts ($5 33-301 @ m); regional airport authorities ($5 21-801 @ 
m); cemetery maintenance districts ($5 27-101 @ &; fire protection districts ($5 31- 
1401 a m ) ;  ambulance districts ( $ 5  3 1-3908 @ seq.); regional solid waste disposal 
districts ($$ 3 1-4901 a m ) ;  recreation districts ($5 31-4301 a m ) ;  library districts ($5 
33-2701 am); hospital districts ($$39-1301 @seq.); mosquito abatement districts ($5 
39-2801 @ m ) ;  highway districts (5s 40-1301 a); water and sewer districts ($$ 42- 
3201 a m ) ;  irrigation districts ($5 43-101 @ m ) ;  and auditorium districts (5s 67- 
4901). See Michael C. Moore, fie Idaho Constitution & Local Gover~ments - Selected 
Topics, 31 IDAHO L. Rw. 417,422 & n. 29 (1995). Most numerous among these are 
likely school districts. However, a school district is not an "agency" under the 
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), Idaho Code $ 67-5201, w, 128 at 72 1-22, 
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and is likewise not a "state agency" under Idaho Code 12-1 17(3)(b). Rogers v. 
Gooding Pub. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 23 1, 135 Idaho 480,485,20 P.3d 16 (2001) (holding, 
however, that a school district is a "taxing district" under section 12-1 17). See also 
IDAHO CODE 5 3 1-4903 (stating that regional solid waste disposal districts "shall not be 
deemed to be an agency of the state of Idaho nor of any of its political subdivisions"). 
"State agency" analysis under section 12-1 17 does not appear to have been applied to 
other single purpose districts named above, but "as governmental entities whose creation 
has been authorized by the state7' and "not as state agencies or departments," there is no 
reason to believe that Courts would treat them any differently. 
EIPHD does not dispute that, technically speaking, it is "authorized by law 
to . . . determine contested cases[.]" IDAHO CODE 5 67-5201(2). However, rulemaking 
authority is only part of the definition. Only state government entities are "agencies" 
under the APA. Petersen, 130 Idaho at 182. In contrast, the legislature created "public 
health districts" as, explicitly, not "state agencies or departments[.]" See IDAHO CODE $5 
39-401,39-408. The current name, "Eastern Idaho Public Health District," is therefore 
more in line with the statutory creation of "public health districts" than was "District 
Seven Health Department." In fact, if public health districts are not "state agencies," 
IDAHO CODE $39-401, district health departments and district boards of health are even 
more removed from a state agency as they are created and established within "each public 
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health district." IDAI-10 CODE § 39-409. Ultimately, Sunnyside's undue emphasis on the 
name of the public health district is not as important as the fact that section 39-401 
clearly establishes that public health districts are not state agencies or departments. There 
is no way around this fact. 
Sunnyside's reliance upon the Court's application of 12-1 17 to "the 
activities of an agency or other enumerated governmental entity" in Rincover v. State, 
Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) to establish an "irreconcilable 
conflict" is unavailing. If the governmental entity is "enumerated" as Rincover suggests, 
it must be so in an applicable statute. Only section 67-5201(2) "enumerates" the 
"governmental entities" to which section 12-1 17 apply, including a "state board, 
commission, department or officer[.]" EIPHD is clearly none of the above. 
The proper characterization of a health district is as a "governmental 
entit[y] whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other 
single purpose districts" and "not as [a] state agenc[y] or department[]." IDAHO CODE $ 
39-401. Sunnyside has given no reasons for its claim that EIPHD is a state agency (other 
than stating that it has some mlemaking authority) and simply glosses over the clear 
language of the enabling statute. EIPHD has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor 
could it ever be so under the current statutory framework. Since EIPHD is not a state 
agency, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under section 12-1 17. 
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2. Sunnvside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 4 12-1 17 
as EIPHD did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Attorney fees are awardable under section 12-1 17 in cases involving a state 
agency "if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." When an agency "has no authority to take a 
particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Univ. of Utah Hosp. 
v. Ada Countv Bd. of Commr's, 143 Idaho 808,812,153 P.3d 1154 (2007). However, if 
an agency's actions are based upon a "reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute," then attorney fees should not be awarded. Ralph Naylor Farms. LLC 
v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809 172 P.3d 1081 (2007). Attorney fees are 
inappropriate if the issue is one of first impression, or if the entity presented a legitimate 
question for the Court to address. Lane Ranch v. Citv of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 175 
P.3d 776 (2007); State Dep't of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 
284, 1 P.3d 783 (1999). The statute focuses on the "overall action" of the state agency. 
State Dev't of Finance, 134 Idaho 282; Rincover v. State, Dev't of Finance, 132 Idaho 
547,976 P.2d 473 (1999); Rincover v. State. Dev't of Finance, 129 Idaho 442,926 P.2d 
626 (1996). The purpose of section 12-1 17 is two-fold: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have 
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
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attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made." Rincover, 132 Idaho 
at 549. 
In this case, the District Court properly recognized a substantial factual 
basis for re-imposing sanitary restrictions. "Specifically, there is no dispute that the 
Petitioner's septic tank was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the 
property. Such a condition would create a public health concern reasonably prompting 
some action on the part of EIPHD." R. p. 165-66. The factual bases for re-imposing 
sanitary restrictions were extremely serious. Sunnyside does not dispute the fact that 
their act of connecting I I commercial buildings to a system permitted for "1 or 2" was 
invariably the cause of the hazardous sewage spill. AR, Doc. 16,T 6. 
Due to such circumstances, EIPHD reasonably felt compelled to act. 
EIPHD had a general statutory power to "do all things required for the preservation and 
protection of public health." IDAHO CODE 5 39-414(2). EIPHD reasonably believed that 
its clear authority over individual systems included Sunnyside's system, which was 
installed in 1996 as an individual subsurface sewage disposal system for "1 or 2 
commercial office buildings[.]" AR, Pet. Exh. C. Since EIPHD was responsible for 
lifting sanitary restrictions in conjunction with Sunnyside's application for subdivision 
approval, and Sunnyside had never been approved for a "central system," EIPHD 
therefore reasonably believed that Sunnyside needed approval of a "central septic 
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system" in order for their system to be regarded as such. EIPHD also reasonably 
believed tbat it was the "responsible agency" to "re-impose sanitary restrictions for water 
and sewer systems" for which it had originally lifted sanitary restrictions. R. p. 39. The 
District Court ultimately disagreed, holding that "the status of Petitioners' septic tank as a 
"central system" is not conditioned upon whether it is operating properly or is perceived 
to be in compliance with applicable pennit requirements or regulations." R. p. 106. 
EIPHD reasonably believed, however erroneously, that it had authority to 
re-impose sanitary restrictions. As noted by the District Court, District Seven personnel 
including Home and other board members recognized DEQ's general authority over 
central systems. However, after reasonably evaluating authority in both statute and the 
MOU, EXPHD officials believed tbat Sunnyside's system was not a central system and 
they reasonably supported the re-imposition of sanctions. 
EIPHD's authority, accordingly, presented a legitimate question for the 
District Court to determine. This was not a situation in which EIPHD acted with 
knowledge of lack of any authority. EIPHD reasonably believed that their general 
statutory authority to do all things necessary for the protection of the public health and 
their authority to initially lift sanitary restrictions meant they had the authority to re- 
impose sanitary restrictions under the version of the DEQ MOU then applicable. EIPHD 
ultimately was proven wrong, but their actions had a reasonable factual basis and were 
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not completely "groundless or arbitrary." Accordingly, Sunnyside is not entitled to 
attorney fees under $ 12- 1 17. 
C. Attorney Fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121. 
Appellants argue they are entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho 
Code $ 12-121, which states: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, 
repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of 
attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any 
person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
The award of attorney fees pursuant to $ 12-121 is governed by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e): 
(1) Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. Provided, 
attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the 
court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12- 
121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
Idaho Code $ 12-121 allows a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in any civil action. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710,717, 170 P.3d 375,382 
(2007). Again, EIPHD does not dispute that Sunnyside was the prevailing party in its 
action for judicial review. Accordingly, the Court must determine (1) Sunnyside's 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 19 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review was a "civil action;" and (2) 
whether all defenses asserted by EIPHD were, as a whole, defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. If the Court concludes either determination in the 
negative, it should then find that Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code 5 12-121. 
1. Sunwside is not entitled to attornev fees under Idaho Code (1 12-121 
as the Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review was 
not a "civil action." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of attorney fees under 
5 12-12 1, a "civil action" is an action "commenced" by filing a complaint with a court. 
Sanchez v. State Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 141 P.3d 1108 (2006). A 
"complaint" may be "denominated as a complaint, petition or application[.]" Driver v. SI 
h, 139 Idaho 423,429,80 P.3d 1024 (2003) (citing Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure). However, for an action to be a civil action within the meaning of Rule 
3(a) and Idaho Code 5 12-121, it must be "commenced" by the filing of a "complaint." 
Id. "Therefore, no matter what the characterization of the action, it appears that it must 
commence by a filing having the characteristics of a complaint for these provisions to 
apply." Id. 
Sunnyside fails to grasp the fact that the action must "commence" by the 
filing of a "complaint" with the "court." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 3(a). "Commence" is not 
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defined by Rule 3(a), but is commonly understood to mean "to initiate," or to "begin." 
WEBSTER'S TIiIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 456 (1966). Hence, the court in 
Sanchez concluded that 5 12- 12 1 does not authorize an award of attorney fees in a 
judicial review of an administrative proceeding. Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243 (holding that 
appeal from decision of Idaho Personnel Commission was not a "civil action"). See also 
Staff of Idaho Real Estate C o m ' n  v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,22 P.3d 105 (2001) 
(judicial review of decision of Idaho Real Estate Commission); Johnson v. Idaho Central 
Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867,908 P.2d 560 (1995) (judicial review of denial of claim for 
unemployment benefits brought before Idaho Industrial Commission); Knight v. Dev't of 
Ins., State of Idaho, 119 Idaho 591,808 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. 1991) (judicial review of 
decision of Department of Insurance); World Cup Ski Shop, Inc. v. Citv of Ketchum, 118 
Idaho 294,796 P.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1990) (judicial review of administrative ruling of 
Ketchum's Planning and Zoning Commission); Lowerv v. Bd. of Countv Commr's for 
Ada County, 1 17 Idaho 1079,793 P.2d 125 1 (1990) (judicial review from action of a 
board of county commissioners). 
The underlying action in this case was undeniably commenced at the 
administrative level on October 27, 2006 by Petitioners' letter indicating a Notice of 
Appeal from the decision of Kellye Eager to re-impose sanitary restrictions on 
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Sunnyside, and not as a compla.int before a district court. AR, Doc. 3. Only on appeal 
from the decision of the Board of Health was the case brought before a "court." 
Sunnyside relies on the decision in Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and 
Tax I07 Idaho 854,693 P.2d 1056 (1984) for the position that, if a party filed a ., 
complaint against an administrative ruling, rather than an "appeal," attorney fees should 
be allowed under section 12-121. App. Br. pp. 18-19. This argument is tenuous at best. 
This Court in Lowery explained that Boaner was unusually "initiated by filing a 
complaint'' and "must be read in light of those facts." 117 Idaho 1079, 1082. Bogner "is 
not authority for awarding of attorney fees in an administrative ruling appeal." Id. 
Justice Bistline's concurrence in Lowery gave insight into the unusual circumstances of 
Bogner: 
Bogner . . . was a one-of-a-kind case, and accordingly can have little 
precedential effect. . . . It was an appeal to the district court and it was 
initiated by the filing of a complaint. Footnote 4 of Bogner, 107 Idaho at 
857,693 P.2d at 1059, sets out the provisions of I.C. $ 63-3049, which as 
applicable are synopsized to inform that a Tax Commission final 
assessment (following redetermination) "may be reviewed" in the district 
court of the taxpayer's county of residence, or in Ada County "by a 
complaint" which is timely filed, provided that the taxpayer shall have first 
paid the tax. The same statute provides that the district court decision may 
be appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Bogner was a highly unusual 
procedural circumstance, and neither of the litigants in the present action 
cited it. 
Id. at 1082-83 (citation omitted). This Court should not view the Bogner decision as 
-
anything more than that explained by Justice Bistline's dissent. 
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Sunnyside's emphasis on the "declaratory judgment" portion of their 
petition for judicial review elevates form over substance, and does not rely upon any 
good law. The case of Allen v. Blaine CounQ, 131 Idaho 138,953 P.2d 578 (1998) 
(which Sunnyside mistakenly refers to as "State v. Christensen") does not support 
Sunnyside's proposition. 
In &, the Allens filed a complaint requesting judicial review of Blaine 
County's denial of their application for approval to build a rental home on their leased 
property. Id. at 139-40. The Allens also filed a declaratory judgment under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act, declaring that plat restrictions were null and void as applied to 
them. Id. at 140. The district court denied the Allens' claims on a motion for summary 
judgment, and granted summary judgment to the County. Id. On appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the district court ruling and further declared that attorney fees 
under section 12- 12 1 would not be awarded. Id. at 142. The Court stated: "Attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not available to parties in an appeal from an agency decision 
because it is not 'a civil action . . . commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Id. 
The Court's next discussion concerning the declaratory judgment action-upon which 
Sunnyside hangs its hat-can best be described as dicta: 
However, under the IDAPA, a party aggrieved by a final agency 
action may file a petition for review or a declaratory judgment in the 
appropriate district court after exhausting all administrative remedies. Even 
if the Court were to treat the petition for a declaratory judgment as a 
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"complaint," constituting a civil action, as contemplated by I.C. 5 12- 12 1, 
an award of attorney fees would not be appropriate. The main issue on 
appeal involved the statutory interpretation of a term under chapter 13, title 
50 of the Idaho Code, which this Court had not construed. The law in this 
area was not well settled. Accordingly, no attorney fees are awarded. 
Id. at 143. 
-
&n has never been cited for the proposition that a "declaratory judgment" 
concerning the actions of a governmental entity on review from a decision by that entity 
constitutes a "civil action." Since u, however, this Court has repeatedly addressed 
appeals from administrative bodies, and has stated that "no matter what h e  
characterization of the action, it appears that it must commence by a filing having the 
characteristics of a complaint[.]" m, 139 Idaho at 429. 
Sunnyside's "Petition" does not have these characteristics. Sunnyside 
erroneously implies that the declaratory relief it sought was somehow new at the district 
court setting, as if it were akin to a "complaint." But both of Sunnyside's prayers for 
"declaratory judgment" had been made previously. In their December 19,2006 Notice of 
Appeal of Director Horne's decision, Sunnyside argued both that EIPHD lacked 
jurisdiction to re-impose sanitary restrictions on central systems under DEQ's 
responsibility, and that sanitary restrictions could not be re-imposed as construction was 
in compliance with approved plans and specifications and substantially complied with 
regulatory standards in effect at the time of construction. AR, Doc. l 0 , l l  a, d & e. 
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Sunnyside asked the Board of Health to find the same and withdraw the Notice of Intent 
to re-impose sanitary restrictions. AR, Doc. 10, q/ c. The Board of Health ultimately 
ruled against him on both grounds, and Sunnyside appealed. 
The requests in Sunnyside's Petition more appropriately fit within the type 
of relief available on judicial review under $67-5279. In paragraph 4, Sunnyside states 
the basis for its Petition: "Plaintiffs are parties aggrieved by a final Order of Defendant's 
Board of Health entered in a contested case and Plaintiffs are entitled to judicial review 
of such Order pursuant to IDAPA 04.11 .01.790 and Idaho Code $ 67-5270." (R. p. 6). 
The Petition then continues by stating: "The Order appealed from is not a preliminary, 
procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling." Id. 
The basis for Sunnyside's appeal-IDAPA 04.1 1.01.790-states as follows: 
"Pursuant to Section 67-5270, Idaho Code, any party aggrieved by a final 
order of an agency in a contested case may appeal to district court. 
Pursuant to Section 67-527 1, Idaho Code, a person is not entitled to judicial 
review of an agency action in district court until that person has exhausted 
all administrative remedies available with the agency. . . ." 
Idaho Code $ 67-5270 also states that "[a] person aggrieved by a final order in a 
contested case decided by an agency . . . is entitled to judicial review under this chapter." 
And that was exactly the way the District Court viewed the matter on 
appeal. Judge Tingey stated that "the sole issue . . . is whether District Seven's actions 
were in excess of its statutory authority. I.C. $ 67-5279(3)(b)." (R. p. 104). Granting 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 25 
Sunnyside's third and fourth prayer for relief on judicial review, the Court concluded that 
"District Seven's issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its reimposition of sanitary 
restrictions . . . was without authority" under section 67-5279(3)@) and invalidated the 
Certificate of Disapproval and the Corrected Certificate of Disapproval. (R. p. 108). The 
district court decision did not "avoid" the need to analyze Sunnyside's prayers for 
judicial review as claimed by Sunnyside, it granted judicial review. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, the 
Court stated the following concerning the relief sought by Sunnyside in its Petition: 
This Court also finds that the relief sought and obtained by 
Petitioners is . ,  that the Health District reimposed sanitary restrictions 
without authority, was relief available to Petitioners on judicial review 
regardless of whether a petition for judicial review was combined with a 
request for declaratory judgment. I.C. $ 67-5279. Denoting "declaratory 
judgment" in thepetition made no appreciable difference in the Court's 
consideration and adjudication of the issues. 
(R. p. 200-4). 
Sunnyside's case should, in its entirety, be characterized as judicial review 
or an "appeal" of the decision of the Board of Health of EIPHD. Even if it were a 
"declaratory judgment," it would not be a "civil action" under $ 12-121 as Sunnyside's 
"declaratory judgment" claims did not "commence" before the "court." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 
3(a). There is no Idaho law supporting the position that claims repeated in a "declaratory 
judgment" regarding the actions of a governmental entity on appeal from a decision by 
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that entity constitute a "civil action." Sunnyside's Petition was clearly an appeal, termed 
as "judicial review" under the APA. As such, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees 
under 512-121. 
2. Sunnvside is not entitled to attornev fees under Idaho Code 6 12-121 
as EIPHD did not defend frivolouslv, unreasonablv or without 
foundation. 
An award of attorney fees under this statute is not a matter of right to the 
prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the 
abiding belief that the proceeding was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 
559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). In an action involving multiple claims or defenses, 
fees are justified only where all claims brought or defenses asserted are frivolous and 
without foundation. Magic Valley Radiologv Assoc., P.A. v. Prof. Bus. Sew., Inc., 1 19 
Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (1991). When deciding whether an action was pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the 
litigation must be taken into account. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Cow., 140 Idaho 
416,95 P.3d 34 (2004). If the action presents mixed issues of law and fact, the court 
must determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a "fairly 
debatable" issue under the legal theories advanced, or whether instead the position 
advanced was plainly fallacious. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 112 
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P.3d 825 (2005). If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be 
awarded under Idaho Code $ 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or 
legal claims that may be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Kiebert v. Goss, 
144 Idaho 225, 159 P.3d 862 (2007). The fact a defense fails as a matter of law is not 
dispositive of whether it was frivolous or without merit. Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 
1023,812 P.2d 737 (1991). 
EIPHD's lack of authority to re-impose sanitary restrictions was not as 
clearly defined as Sunnyside asserts. EIPHD reasonably believed that Sunnyside's 
particular system remained under their statutory authority. There was clearly some 
confusion concerning whether DEQ oversaw enforcement actions for Sunnyside's 
existing system, whether Petitioners' system actually was a "central septic system," and 
what authority the MOU granted in conjunction with EIPHD's statutory authority. This 
confusion existed even between DEQ and EIPHD, which confusion resulted in 
amendments to the MOU. 
This does not mean, however, that EIPHD defended the case "frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." Indeed, the District Court recognized that 
"[a]lthough this Court found that such a general grant of power did not supplant specific 
granted authority to DEQ to re-impose sanitary restrictions, it nevertheless forms a legal 
basis for EIPHD's action. Furthermore. the record establishes a course of conduct 
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between EIPHD and the Department of Environmental Quality arguably justifying its 
action in re-imposing sanitary restrictions." R. p. 166. EIPHD believed, however 
erroneously, that it had authority over Sunnyside's system since no plans and 
specifications for a central septic system had ever been submitted to DEQ because the 
permit issued for the existing system was issued by EIPHD and because EIPHD was the 
authority that originally lifted the restrictions. 
More importantly, even if the court found EIPHD's defense of the authority 
position to be unreasonable or frivolous, this case involved multiple claims and defenses 
and multiple legal and factual issues. Sunnyside has not shown, nor could they prove, 
that "[tlhe total defense of a party's proceedings" were unreasonable or frivolous. 
Vallev Radiology, 119 Idaho at 563. This is the standard. Sunnyside argued in their 
Petition not only that EIPHD lacked authority, but that (a) their system was in 
compliance with approved plans, (b) there was no factual basis for EIPHD's re- 
imposition of sanctions, and (c) EIPHD violated § 67-5279(3). R. p. 10-13. Sunnyside 
also made several factual allegations that were vigorously disputed by EIPHD. R. p. 5- 
10. All of EIPHD's defenses-and each defense in particular-were not "plainly 
fallacious" throughout the entire course of the litigation. United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. 
Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007). EIPHD's defenses instead presented 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 29 
"legitimate, triable issues of fact" which were, at the very least, "fairly debatable" under 
the law. Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 228; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 141 Idaho at 542. 
As Sunnyside has failed to show that the totality of EIPHD's defense was 
unreasonable or frivolous, attorney fees are not available under Idaho Code $ 12-121. 
D. Without any statutory basis and without making any argument 
therefor, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees on Appeal. 
Sunnyside's request for fees on appeal should be denied as it cannot prevail 
on either its claim to fees under $ 12-1 17 or $ 12-121. 
Furthermore, in order for Sunnyside to prevail in its claim for attorney fees 
on appeal, it must be entitled to these fees by statute. However, as stated above, 
Sunnyside is not entitled to fees under either $ 12-1 17 (as EIPHD is not a "state agency") 
and $ 12-121 (as the Petition for judicial review was not a "civil action"). Absent 
statutory authority, Sunnyside is not entitled to fees on appeal. 
Even if EIPHD were a "state agency," or Sunnyside's Petition was a "civil 
action," Sunnyside has not shown that EIPHD has acted on appeal without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law, or has defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. 
Finally, as Sunnyside has not presented the Court any argument in support 
of their contention that they are entitled to fees under $ 12-1 17 and $ 12-121 on appeal, 
they have not complied with Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). When a party requesting attorney 
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fees on appeal cites statutory authority but does not present argument in compliance with 
I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the Court will not address the request. Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 
945,947, 88 P.3d 764 (2004). Under I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the argument portion of the 
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
Sunnyside's request for attorney fees does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) 
because they failed to provide argument in support of their request. Sunnyside sets out 
their request for fees and cites Idaho Code $ 5  12-1 17 and 12- 12 1, but do not provide 
reasons why they should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. This is Sunnyside's only 
mention of fees on appeal, and, according to Goldrnan, it is inadequate. 139 Idaho at 
948. 
Sddell v. Jenkins, 11 1 Idaho 857,727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986) is not 
authority for the proposition that an appellant may receive fees on appeal without any 
basis in law or without making any argument. This Court should, accordingly, deny 
Sunnyside's bare request for fees on appeal. 
Since there is no statutory authority for fees, EIPHD does not request the 
same on appeal. However, EIPHD does request its costs under I.A.R. 40. 
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111. CONCLUSION 
The legislature has clearly defined in what situations attorney fees are 
available under Idaho Code §§ 12-1 17 and 12-121. Sunnyside's appeal of a non-state 
agency's administrative decision does not qualify under either statute. This is not the 
first time this Court has faced a situation where neither statute applied. See, e.g.* Home 
v. Idaho State University, 138 Idaho 700,69 P.3d 120 (2003) (denying fees under 8 12- 
117 as University was not a "state agency," and under § 12-121 as case was an appeal 
from Personnel Commission and therefore not a "civil action"). As Sunnyside lacks a 
statutory basis for fees, and EIPHD reasonably presented debatable positions before the 
district court as to its authority to re-impose sanitary restrictions, the decision of the 
District Court should be affirmed, and costs should be awarded to EIPHD. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 9 ' ~  day of August, 2008. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy 
of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this lgth day of August, 2008. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
By: 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
'JOvernight Delivery 
o Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile 
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